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Since November 2016, Switzerland is affected by a ma-
jor outbreak of avian influenza (AI) in wild birds. The 
Avian Influenza A virus belongs to the family Orthomyx-
oviridae and is a single stranded, segmented, nega-
tive-sense RNA virus. Single point mutations (antigen-
ic drift) occur frequently, and exchange of entire genome 
segments between two different influenza viruses co-in-
fecting a host cell simultaneously (antigenic shift) may 
lead to significant changes in virus characteristics and 
are key factors for onset of new pandemics. Haemagglu-
tinin (HA) and neuraminidase (N) are the two major 
surface glycoproteins. Highly pathogenic avian influen-
za (HPAI) viruses contain a multi basic cleavage site 
within the HA, exhibit an intravenous pathogenicity 
index > 1.2 in 6-week-old inoculated chickens or cause 
more than 75% mortality within 10 days in 4 to 6-week-
old intravenously inoculated chickens (OIE, 2015). The 
recent AI strain, HPAI H5N8 2016/17, belongs to clade 
2.3.4.4b, which is different from the HPAI H5N8 clade 
2.3.4.4a virus, that was introduced into Europe in Feb-
ruary 2014, causing outbreaks in commercial chicken 
holdings in Hungary, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom (Verhagen et al., 2015). Clin-
ical symptoms of AI vary from subclinical to severe 
respiratory or enteric disease depending on the virus 
strain, the virus pathogenicity and the host. Wild ducks 
as the natural reservoir usually exhibit no or mild, most-
ly enteric symptoms. In contrast, HPAI in chickens and 
turkeys may lead to 100% mortality within a few days 
(Swayne et al., 2013).
Chronology of the outbreak and  
measures
In September 2016, the FAO empres watch (FAO, 2016) 
published an alert on the detection of a “Goose/Guang-
dong/96 lineage H5N8 HPAI of clade 2.3.4.4” in migra-
tory water birds at Lake Ubsu-Nur in the Russian Fed-
eration (Lee et al., 2017). Hungary reported the first 
outbreak in wild birds on October 19, 2016 (OIE, 2016) 
and the first outbreak in poultry on November 1, 2016 
(OIE, 2016). In Switzerland, on November 4, 2016, sev-
eral dead tufted ducks were found in the yacht harbour 
of Kreuzlingen (Lake Constance). Three carcasses were 
selected by the veterinary service and submitted to the 
National Reference Centre for Poultry and Rabbit Dis-
eases (NRGK) in Zurich. The suspicious necropsy find-
ings and the subsequent positive M-gene real-time re-
verse transcriptase PCR ((rtRT-PCR), (Dalessi et al., 
2007)) confirmed the detection of AIV, further corrob-
orated by a positive H5 rtRT-PCR (Slomka et al., 2007). 
For pathotyping and determination of the neuramini-
dase subtype, organ samples (brain and kidney) were 
submitted to the Institute of Virology and Immunology 
(IVI) in Mittelhäusern. HPAI H5N8 could be confirmed 
by PCR and sequencing (Gall et al., 2008) on Novem-
ber 9, 2016 with an immediate report to the OIE (OIE, 
2016). Within one week a fast spread across the Swiss 
Central Plateau from the north-east (Lake Constance) 
to the south-west (Lake Geneva) occurred. During the 
second week of the outbreak, a newly designed N8 rtRT-
PCR was implemented at the NRGK: forward primer 
“Flu_N8_IVI_F”: 5’-GYTCCATTGTRATGTGTG-
GA-3’, reverse primer “Flu_N8_IVI_R”: 5’-ACRTCT-
TRTCGATGTCAAARG-3’ and probe “FLU_N8_
IVI_P”: 5’-FAMTGGWCRTGGCACGATGGAGCTAT 
YC-BHQ-1-3’. Altogether until the end of March 2017, 
119 of 387 tested samples were positive for H5N8 over 
the course of 21 weeks. The number of samples and the 
positive detections changed over time. In the first week 
81% (17 out of 21), in the second week 67% (60 out of 
89), and in the third week 39% (29 out of 74) of samples 
yielded positive results. From the fourth week on until 
the end of the year 11 out of 93 (12%) submissions were 
tested positive. In 2017 ( January - March), 2 out of 106 
(2%) were positive. In total, 14 wild bird species were 
affected in Switzerland (Table 1) but no introductions 
into commercial poultry or backyard flocks occurred. 
The last positive case of the winter season was found on 
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January 1, 2017 at Lake Geneva. The Federal Food Safe-
ty and Veterinary Office (FSVO) enacted a regulation 
for risk areas (BLV, 2016) on November 11, 2016. It was 
extended nationwide on November 15 (BLV, 2016) and 
suspended on March 18, 2017 (BLV, 2017).
Discussion
Europe was affected by two waves of HPAI H5N8. The 
first wave began in November 2016 and lasted until the 
end of the year (FLI, 2017). Switzerland was only affect-
ed during this period. A second wave with remarkably 
more introductions into poultry, especially in France 
and Germany, began in February 2017 and is still ongo-
ing in several European countries (Plateforme ESA, 
2017). Clusters of outbreaks in high dense poultry pro-
ducing regions were observed (FLI, 2017). The number 
of introductions into poultry, the variety of affected 
wild birds and the geographical distribution of reporting 
countries (e.g. Great Britain, Finland, Portugal, Ugan-
da), reveal the far-reaching impact of HPAI H5N8 (FAO, 
2017).
Lee and co-workers (2015) mapped the main flyways of 
migratory birds from the breeding sites in Siberia to-
wards either Asia, Europe or North America. The Euro-
pean flyway subdivides into three routes. Lake Con-
stance and Lake Geneva are located along the 
south-western route and are important stopover sites, 
harbouring up to 500’000 migratory birds each winter, 
whereof approximately 105’000 tufted ducks (Strebel, 
2016). Tufted ducks were the most affected wild aquatic 
bird species in Switzerland, followed by Caspian gulls 
and mute swans (Table 1). Tufted ducks belong to the 
subfamily Aythyinae, populate fresh water lakes and feed 
on bivalves, snails and invertebrates mainly by diving 
(Keller, 2011). They are water-bound as well as many of 
the other affected species (Table 1) - this might lower 
the risk of virus transmission into poultry holdings. 
Table 1: List of wild bird species in Switzerland which were tested positive for avian influenza virus H5N8 until the end of 
March 2017. Number of positive samples compared to total of submitted samples of respective species, numeric and ex-
pressed as a percentage. The right column shows selected sequencing results of the cleavage site within the haemaggluti-
nin HA (marked in bold).
Species
English (Latin)
German/French
Positive/Tested/% Sequence HA
Tufted duck (Aythya fuligula)
Reiherente/Fuligule morillon
54/62 (87.1%) PLREKRRKR/GLF
Caspian gull (Larus cachinnans)
Weisskopfmöwe/Goéland leucophée
17/19 (89.5%) n.a.
Mute swan (Cygnus olor)
Höckerschwan/Cygne tuberculé
10/37 (27.0%) PLREKRRKR/GLF
Black-headed gull (Chroicocephalus ridibundus)
Lachmöwe/Mouette rieuse
8/23 (12.5%) PLREKRRKR/GLF
Common pochard (Aythya ferina)
Tafelente/Fuligule milouin
6/8 (75.0%) n.a.
Great crested grebe (Podiceps cristatus)
Haubentaucher/Grèbe huppé
5/26 (19.2%) n.a.
Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos)
Stockente/Canard colvert
4/13 (30.8%) PLREKRRKR/GLF
Little grebe (Tachybaptus rubicollis)
Zwergtaucher/Grèbe castagneux
3/3 (100.0%) n.a.
Gull (Laridae)
Möwe/Mouette
3/7 (42.9%) n.a.
Red-crested pochard (Netta rufina)
Kolbenente/Nette rousse
2/8 (25.0%) n.a.
Black coot (Fulica atra)
Blässhuhn/Foulque macroule
1/9 (11.1%) n.a.
Common moorhen (Gallinula chloropus)
Teichralle/Gallinule poule-d’eau
1/2 (50.0%) n.a.
Peregrine (Falco peregrinus)
Wanderfalke/Faucon pèlerin
1/1 (100.0%) n.a.
Common buzzard (Buteo buteo)
Mäusebussard/Buse variable
1/30 (3.3%) n.a.
Species not classified 3/3 (100.0%) n.a.
n.a. = not analyzed
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Other key factors for the absence of HPAI H5N8 out-
breaks in Swiss poultry holdings are speculated to be: 
1) duck meat production and geese fattening is not com-
mon in Switzerland; 2) turkey meat production is a 
niche production accounting for 1.8% of total poultry 
production in Switzerland (Agristat, 2015); 3) storage of 
feed and bedding is usually indoor or in silos which 
limits accessibility for wild birds; 4) mostly use of ex-
panded feed; 5) low maximum livestock density per 
flock and square meter restricted by law (TSchV, 2008); 
6) poultry farms are more evenly spread across the coun-
try, with no densely populated poultry areas like e.g. in 
Lower Saxony in Germany; 7) biosecurity standards are 
high and generally well maintained; 8) population of 
overwintering wild aquatic birds in Switzerland is ap-
parently stable, continuous arrival of new individuals is 
not common along the flyway (after the main migration 
event in November, a rapid spread among the wild bird 
population occurred mostly without drastic population 
decline). Despite these advantages, the following risk 
factors must be considered: 1) Switzerland is located 
along the 0°C isotherm line in winter. Migrating aquat-
ic birds stay close to this line to keep access to non-fro-
zen water bodies while limiting energy waste and in-
crease the possibility to be among the first birds back in 
Siberia to occupy the best breeding sites (Reperant et 
al., 2010); 2) in 2015 91% of Swiss livestock poultry was 
kept in BTS (particularly animal-friendly housing) sys-
tem with a protected outdoor area (BLW, 2016) allowing 
close contact to wildlife. Considering the above, Swit-
zerland may have to face future AI outbreaks, potential-
ly also in livestock poultry population and must thus 
be prepared. Hence, experiences gained since November 
2016 were analyzed and discussed by cantonal authori-
ties, reference laboratories and different stakeholders 
(among others: poultry industry, fancy breed associa-
tion) in an AI-debriefing meeting at the FSVO in June 
2017. Positive points were the rapid decisions of author-
ities in cooperation with the official veterinary service, 
reference laboratories and the industry as well as ex-
change of information with neighbouring states. This 
allowed the implementation of accepted regulations by 
all parties. Further, the centralized and generally well-or-
chestrated communication strategy of the FSVO dealing 
with media requests and regular updates of the FSVO 
website led to a uniformity of public information. 
Amendable and discussed points were: 1) sampling 
guidelines were still based on the HPAI H5N1 outbreak 
in 2005/06 and had to be updated shortly after the out-
break. Suitable sampling material was not at hand in all 
cantons; 2) the exact number of affected birds in Swit-
zerland is not known. In clusters of dead birds only few 
individuals were randomly selected for analysis and if a 
species at a particular location had already been tested 
positive it was not retested. This economic resource 
management resulted in sufficient diagnostic and per-
sonnel capacities in reference laboratories at all time and 
upscaling was not necessary. However, awareness has to 
remain high that an upcoming larger or potentially zo-
onotic outbreak could occur and would increase the 
number of samples extraordinarily. Stakeholders and 
politicians need to know, that such a crisis can only be 
handled by well-trained personnel and that cooperation 
plans between laboratories and authorities need to be 
ready before the onset of a crisis to be able to process 
high amounts of samples within a short time; 3) the 
decision to extend the regulation nationwide was rea-
sonable, as H5N8 was detected at all major lakes of the 
Central Plateau, and as Switzerland’s water-rich topog-
raphy complicates zoning of every single detection in 
wild birds and would exhaust resources. The prohibition 
of exhibitions might have been drastic for fancy breed-
ers, but was important for risk reduction of a virus spread 
across cantonal boundaries. Especially as an AI infec-
tion may be undetected in backyard poultry or fancy 
breeds due to smaller flocks with a different age-com-
position, possibly resulting in non-uniform and less 
dramatic clinical signs or fewer deaths (C. Bothmann, 
LAVES, Oldenburg, personal communication).
Although H5N8 kills water birds, it is maintained to 
some extent in healthy water fowl and circulates within 
the local population, as shown by virus detection in 
juvenile mute swans and mallards found dead at Lake 
Neuchâtel and Lake Geneva in August 2017. Thus, such 
a virus does not miraculously disappear after an out-
break event, and constant vigilance is necessary.
Conclusion
Reviewing the history of AI reveals a tendency to larger 
and more frequent outbreaks over time. The virus itself 
seems to develop towards optimal adaptation in its nat-
ural host, which is reflected in moderate mortality, but 
high levels of virus shedding. This should encourage to 
reconsider and improve biosecurity within the different 
poultry housing systems. The disease awareness of the 
poultry industry and the public should be upheld, espe-
cially before and during the critical time of the year. To 
prevent the emergence of novel human pathogenic 
strains induced by antigenic shift, seasonal flu vaccina-
tion is recommended in humans. With onset of a new 
outbreak, measures and sampling guidelines should be 
immediately available to contain the spread as fast as 
possible. Furthermore, choanal and cloacal swabs are 
the sample materials of choice as submitting carcasses 
for analysis increases the risk of virus spread and ambig-
uous sampling methods affect statistics. The required 
swabs, tubes, protective clothing and further materials 
must be promptly available in every canton (“Seuchen-
koffer” / “trousse d’urgence”). Passive surveillance and 
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reporting of dead wild birds are key factors in early de-
tection, because AI is not eradicable and future out-
breaks must be expected.
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